Saturday, January 03, 2009

RE: Gaza   [Steve Schippert]

Andrew Stuttaford remarked at The Corner earlier on Gaza and its wider implications for United States interests and greater national security. His remarks should get a closer look, as he said in part:

Posting yesterday VDH asked, "When should Israel stop?" Good question. He suggests that it will be at the moment when the Israelis believe "there is a good chance the rockets will stop." Perhaps, but if that's right, it implies that the current exercise will be going on for a very long time indeed, something that is not, I suspect, in the wider strategic interests of the United States.

We shouldn't be in any doubt of the fact that the civilian dead of Gaza will be used as a recruiting device by Jihadists across the Islamic world, and we shouldn't be in any doubt that America will be blamed almost as much as Israel for their deaths. You might argue (and I’d agree with you) that Hamas bears much of the responsibility for the lives that have been lost, but you can be absolutely sure that this is an argument that will be neither heard nor even made in, say, the madrassas of Pakistan or Indonesia, two countries that are also of critical importance to the security of the United States.

He makes a very good point about Pakistani madrassas as well as those in Indonesia, the world's most populated Muslim nation.

However, here's the disconnect, in my view: Our interests do not lie in the madrassas in either nation; they lie with their governments and military ties, however imperfect or shaky. Likewise, our influence is with those bodies, not the fanatic-run madrassas. Our actions (or inaction) — and those of Israel — will never garner favor within those walls and inside the fanatic Islamist circles. And likewise, our actions (or inaction) are only used within that sphere as fuel for the greater fire: The destruction of Israel and the establishment of a regional — then global — caliphate.

Considering this, we should acknowledge such radical flame-fanning but never adjust our policy/actions (or support for Israeli policy/actions) to such. To do so would require faith in a conclusion that there is a chance for peaceful coexistence with these radical Islamist terrorist entities. There is no such chance, not because we don't want it, but because it is their compulsion to reject it. Violently.

It goes back to the basic question: Were 9/11 and other similar attacks globally really because of U.S. or greater Western policy in the minds of the terrorist attackers?  No. Would changing our policies net peace?  No. Changing our policies (military disengagement, withdrawal from region, etc.) is simply a step for them, making the path to their greater aims (regional state domination leading to caliphate) easier and less perilous.

Any lull in terrorist attacks (on the West, mind you) that might result from disengagement (either here, or there, or total) would be fleeting while radical Islamist terrorist groups consume the region's governments. See, for instance, Gaza.

So, as reports arrive of IDF ground forces moving into Gaza as of this writing, let's take a look at the most likely greater aims of Israel in the offensive at hand.

I don't think, as Andrew seems to concur, that Israel will stop the offensive when "there is a good chance the rockets will stop," because that would indeed be a rather long and deadly endeavor.  I don't happen to think this operation is the "end game"-seeking operation. Without pretending to be inside the heads of Israeli strategic thinkers, Operation Cast Lead appears to be meant to condition the battlefield — for an eventual battle that the IDF, ideally, will not take the lead in.

Israel is most likely setting the stage for a Fatah-Hamas showdown redux in Gaza. A couple of things have to happen to prepare for this eventuality first, however.  Hamas has spent two years — under Iranian strategic direction, guidance, assistance and supply — duplicating Hizballah's offensive missile capabilities in order to lure the IDF into a Hizballah-modeled urban defense of tunnels, deception, firepower, and explosives. See here from earlier.

As such, Israel has to accomplish a few things under increased Gaza Hizballah-modeled defenses.

1. Destroy known large weapons caches — for both immediate and down-the-road benefit.
2. Disable the tunnel systems into Egypt that are used to re-supply Hamas's increasingly lethal arsenal.
3. Seal sea-based approaches, as submersible containers are also used to ferry weapons ashore from cargo ships.
4. Liquidate as much of Hamas's key leadership as possible.
5. Liquidate Hamas terrorist ranks, especially rocket crews and builders, as much as possible.

Israel will stop the operations not when the rockets stop, but rather when Israel thinks it has crippled Hamas and hindered its regenerative ability to the point where the next incredibly challenging step can be taken: Assist and empower Fatah enough in Gaza that it can once again raise a significant challenge to Hamas's violent domination there. Fatah was decimated in Gaza by Hamas in '06 and '07. It must be rebuilt.

There are, of course, significant challenges and risks in trusting and empowering Fatah, the offspring of Arafat's PLO. But they are less than that of Israeli re-occupation of Gaza, which would be an absolute requirement for defeating Hamas fully and having "a good chance the rockets will stop."

There are two ways to fight Hamas. This, I believe, is Israel's preferred method.

01/03 02:36 PMShare