Tuesday, December 04, 2007

Appeasement and War - Options Post-NIE?   [Steve Schippert]

A good friend sent over today's editorial from the New York Sun at around 2am. Aptly titled The Van Diepen Demarche, it excoriates significant swaths of the intelligence community for the political battle being waged against the current administration as evidenced in the latest National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.

I haven't been able to write on the NIE yet, as I had then explained to my friend, but found the editorial spot on save for one item in it's conclusion. The e-mail response as I had sent it.

I'll leave you with one thought.

What it means is that when the historians look back on this period, they will see that by sabotaging our diplomacy, our intelligence analysts have clarified the choice before the free world - appeasement or war.

Correction: Appeasement and war. For appeasement of the aggressive and ambitious has never averted war. It has only foregone any alternative and surrendered the initiative to the aggressor.

It doesn't mean we have lost or will lose, but the price sure as hell gets exponentially higher.

Appeasement and war. Those appear the options now. China's off the hook and ElBaradei must be letting out an audible exhale.

You know Dr. ElBaradei, the IAEA chief whose primary tasking is not to uncover and understand the Iranian nuclear program. Rather, said the UN's chief nuclear inspector in June, "I have no brief other than to make sure we don't go into another war or that we go crazy into killing each other. You do not want to give additional argument to new crazies who say 'let's go and bomb Iran.'" So should we question his reports? What if what he finds runs counter to what he believes his only "brief" is? Silly us for thinking he was a technical inspector.

But it doesn't matter, as he - along with China and Russia - are now armed with an American narrative in the form of an ill-advised NIE.

Interestingly, Eli Lake concluded his article on the NIE with an absolutely critical piece of the Estimate.

One explanation for the change in the estimate is the recent disclosure from Iran of some of the documents related to its weapons program to the IAEA. Between September 2003 and September 2007, Iran had stonewalled inspectors and the U.N. agency on inquiries into the history of its previously undeclared nuclear facilities.

On this point, the National Intelligence Estimate says: "We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons."

Yes, of course it's the Key Judgment of the Key Judgments. But the 'critical' aspect beyond the obvious is how stunningly little else in this NIE is "assess[ed] with high confidence." Yet that part, of all parts, is.

So many that are championing this NIE have also dismissed or ignored the nuclear weapons development threat, primarily out of mindless political opposition. The same NIE just affirmed "with confidence" that nuclear weapons were being developed, information the critics did not have during their long objections.

Once Iran finally fields nuclear weapons (they will not announce just one like North Korea), many of the current critics will simply transition their arguments to a position that insists Iran only wants nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes.

That bit "with confidence," in the eyes of critics, just doesn't matter anymore. After all, Van Diepen hath spoken.

Anyone care to explain why the apparently nuclear weapons averse Iranians sent a contingent of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers to observe North Korea's nuclear weapons test in October 2006? Seems a valid question.

Be sure to read The Van Diepen Demarche this morning. When done, take the time to ask these Five Questions Concerning the Latest NIE.

12/04 08:16 AMShare